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Globalization broadly refers to the expansion of worldwide link-
ages within and increasing interdependence of human activity in the 
economic, social, cultural, political, technological, and even biological 
spheres. The areas in which globalization operates can interact with one 
another. For instance, while HIV/AIDS is a biological phenomenon, 
it interacts with economic, social, cultural, political, and technological 
forces at global, regional, national, and community levels. The relation-
ship between globalization and development is not well understood, 
and disagreement regarding this relationship abounds. Globalization is, 
to many, the best means of bringing prosperity to the greatest number of 
people all around the world. For others, it represents an important cause 
of global poverty. 
The fi ve economic dimensions of globalization examined here are 
trade, fi nance, aid, migration, and ideas. Whereas trade is the exchange 
of goods and services among the countries of the world, capital fl ows 
involve the exchange of assets or fi nancial instruments among these 
countries. Foreign aid involves the transfer of loans and grants among 
countries, as well as technical assistance or capacity building. Migration 
takes place when people move between countries, either temporarily or 
permanently, to seek education and employment or to escape adverse 
political environments. Ideas represent the broadest globalization phe-
nomenon. They involve the generation and international transmission 
of intellectual constructs in areas such as technology, management, or 
governance. 
One can hope that these dimensions of economic globalization 
would contribute to development and poverty alleviation, and this is 
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indeed often the case. In other instances, however, the link between 
globalization and development breaks down. As we will argue here, 
there are no statements regarding the relationship between globaliza-
tion and development that are both simple and accurate. Rather, state-
ments regarding this relationship are necessarily complex if they are to 
be accurate.1 
A HISTORICAL VIEW
Economic historians date the modern era of globalization to approx-
imately 1870. The period from 1870 to 1914 is often considered to be 
the birth of the modern world economy, which, by some measures, was 
as integrated as it is today. Historians have observed that, from the point 
of view of capital fl ows, the late 1800s were an extraordinary time.2 
The global integration of capital markets was facilitated by advances 
in rail and ship transportation and in telegraph communication. Euro-
pean colonial systems were at their highest stages of development, and 
migration was at a historical high point in relation to the global popula-
tion of the time. 
This fi rst modern stage of globalization was followed by two addi-
tional stages, one from the late 1940s to the mid-1970s and another from 
the mid-1970s to the present. These, however, were preceded by World 
War I, the Great Depression, and World War II. During these events, 
many aspects of globalization were reversed as the world experienced 
increased confl ict, nationalism, and patterns of economic autarky. To 
some extent, then, the second and third modern stages of globalization 
merely involved regaining lost levels of international integration.
The second modern stage of globalization began at the end of World 
War II. It was accompanied by a global, economic regime developed by 
the Bretton Woods Conference of 1944 establishing the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), what was to become the World Bank, and the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). This stage of global-
ization involved an increase in capital fl ows from the United States, 
as well as a U.S.-inspired production system that relied on exploiting 
economies of scale in manufacturing and the advance of U.S.-based 
multinational enterprises (MNEs). 
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This second stage also involved some reduction of trade barriers 
under the auspices of GATT. Developing countries were not highly 
involved in this liberalization, however. In export products of interest 
to developing countries (agriculture, textiles, and clothing), a system of 
nontariff measures in rich countries evolved. Also, a set of key develop-
ing countries, especially those in Latin America, pursued import substi-
tution industrialization with their own trade barriers.3 These develop-
ments, along with the Cold War, suppressed the integration of many 
developing countries into the world trading system. 
The third modern stage of globalization began in the late 1970s. 
This stage followed the demise of monetary relationships developed 
at the Bretton Woods Conference and involved the emergence of the 
newly industrialized countries of East Asia, especially Japan, Taiwan 
(China), and the Republic of Korea. Rapid technological progress, par-
ticularly in transportation, communication, and information technol-
ogy, began to dramatically lower the costs of moving goods, capital, 
people, and ideas across the globe.4
What has been the historical relationship among these three stages 
of modern globalization and development? A partial view is found in 
Figure 2.1. This fi gure combines a single measure of globalization—
exports as a percentage of world gross domestic product (GDP)—with 
a single measure of poverty—the number of extremely dollar poor peo-
ple—in a time series from 1870 to 1998. What is clear from this fi gure 
is that, historically, globalization and global poverty can be either posi-
tively related or negatively related to each other. From 1870 through 
1929 and the beginning of the Great Depression, globalization (trade) 
and global poverty increased together. However, the retreat from glo-
balization during the Great Depression and World War II was accompa-
nied by a continued increase in global poverty. This can be seen from 
the 1950 data in the fi gure showing that, when exports as a percentage 
of GDP had declined nearly back to the 1870 level, extreme poverty 
reached a peak of approximately 1.4 billion persons.
As seen in Figure 2.1, the increase in globalization as measured by 
trade in the second and third stages of modern globalization has been 
associated with a gradual decline in extreme poverty to approximately 
1.1 billion people. During these stages, globalization and poverty have 
been negatively associated with each other, albeit mildly so. A key public 
policy challenge facing humankind is to eliminate this still-prominent 
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level of extreme poverty. Understanding how to do this requires a deep-
er understanding of the links between globalization and poverty.
TRADE
Of all aspects of globalization, international trade is held out as the 
great hope for poverty alleviation.5 Trade can contribute to poverty alle-
viation by expanding markets, promoting competition, and raising pro-
ductivity, each of which has the potential to increase the real incomes 
of poor people. But it would be a mistake to rely on trade liberalization 
alone as a means of reducing poverty.6 A more comprehensive approach 
is needed that addresses multiple economic and social challenges simul-
taneously and that emphasizes the expansion of poor people’s capabili-
Figure 2.1  Trade and Extreme Poverty in Historical Perspective
SOURCE: Exports as a percentage of GDP from Ocampo and Martin (2003), based on 
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ties, especially in the areas of health and education.7 Nevertheless, trade 
has some vital roles to play.
Since the mid-1980s, developing countries have increased their 
global trade exports signifi cantly, even in services where their com-
parative advantage is typically seen as weak. For various reasons, 
not the least of which are trade barriers maintained by rich countries, 
developing country agricultural (primary) exports have been stagnant 
(see Figure 2.2). There is also a divergence of export experience across 
developing countries, with Africa’s share of world exports declining 
over time.
International trade is a means of expanding markets, and market 
expansion can help generate employment and incomes for poor people. 
Comparisons are often made between the wages of workers in poor-
country export industries and the wages of workers in developed coun-
tries. In these comparisons, the wages of workers in developing-country 
export industries often appear to be very low. Consequently, trade has 
often been identifi ed as poverty worsening. However, the more rele-
SOURCE: World Bank, World Development Indicators Online.
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vant comparison is between the wages of export sector workers with 
agricultural day laborers, both in the same developing country. Here it 
can often be seen that the alternative of agricultural day labor is much 
worse. It is precisely this type of income comparison that draws work-
ers into export industries.8 
It must be kept in mind that not all export activity is equal from 
the point of view of raising the incomes of poor people. Exporting can 
best contribute to poverty alleviation when it supports labor-intensive 
production, human capital accumulation (both education and health), 
and technological learning. In addition, the incomes of poor individuals 
depend on buoyant and sustainable export incomes, which in turn are 
dependent on export prices. 
International trade is also a means of promoting competition, and 
in many instances, this can help poor people. Increased competition 
lowers the real costs of both consumption and production. For exam-
ple, domestic monopolies charge monopoly prices that can be signifi -
cantly above competitive prices. The competition introduced by imports 
erodes market power, lowering prices. These procompetitive effects of 
trade can expand household budgets and lower the costs of production. 
The latter can have additional employment effects that are advanta-
geous to poor individuals by lowering nonwage costs in labor-intensive 
production activities. Procompetitive effects can also arise in the case 
of monopsony power. Here, sellers (small farmers, for example) to the 
monopsony buyer are able to obtain higher prices for their goods as the 
buying power of the monopsonist is eroded.
There is some evidence that international trade can promote pro-
ductivity in a country, and it is possible that productivity increases can 
in turn support the incomes of poor people.9 Exports of all types or in 
all countries cannot generate positive productivity effects, but in cer-
tain instances they can. Export postures can place the exporting fi rms 
in direct contact with discerning international customers, facilitating 
upgrading processes. There is no consensus within international eco-
nomics on the extent of these upgrading effects, but they are present in 
some cases.10
There are occasions when international trade can have direct health 
and safety impacts on poor individuals—impacts that can be benefi cial 
or detrimental. Perhaps most importantly, improving the health out-
comes of poor people usually involves imports of medical products. It 
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is simply not possible for most small, developing countries to produce 
the entire range of even basic medical supplies, no less more advanced 
medical equipment and pharmaceuticals. However, many developing 
countries import large amounts of weaponry and export sexual services, 
both of which can have dramatically negative outcomes for the health 
and safety of poor individuals.11 In addition, the production processes 
of some export industries can adversely affect the health of workers in 
those industries, and a small but important amount of trade involves 
hazardous waste dumping.
CAPITAL FLOWS
Private capital fl ows are an important resource for developing coun-
tries. They augment domestic savings and can contribute to investment, 
growth, fi nancial sector development, and technology transfer. How-
ever, there is also substantial evidence that capital fl ows entail potential 
costs that are both much larger than in the case of trade and dispropor-
tionately carried by the poor. Additionally, it has become clear that not 
all capital fl ows are the same in their benefi t and cost characteristics. 
For these reasons, the cost and benefi t characteristics of distinct types of 
capital fl ows must be considered in some detail.12 Here we distinguish 
among foreign direct investment, equity portfolio investment, bond 
fi nance, and commercial bank lending.
The fi nancial markets involved in equity portfolio investment, bond 
fi nance, and commercial bank lending are characterized by a number 
of market failures. In normal circumstances, these imperfections tend 
to contribute to a certain amount of market volatility, as shown in Fig-
ure 2.3. Under certain circumstances that are not fully understood (but 
are particularly important in emerging economies), they can lead to 
full-blown fi nancial crises. Imperfections in fi nancial markets appear 
to be particularly problematic when commercial banks in developing 
countries are given access to short-term, foreign lending sources.13 The 
resulting problems have three causes. First, systems of fi nancial inter-
mediation in developing countries tend to rely heavily on the banking 
sector, while other types of fi nancial intermediation typically are being 
underdeveloped. Second, developing countries have been encouraged 
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to liberalize domestic fi nancial markets, sometimes before systems of 
prudential bank regulation and management are put in place. Third, 
developing countries have sometimes prematurely liberalized their cap-
ital accounts.14 Consequently, care must be taken in managing evolving 
fi nancial systems and their access to international capital fl ows.
Foreign Direct Investment
Foreign direct investment (FDI) can have positive impacts on pov-
erty by creating employment, improving technology and human capi-
tal, and promoting competition. Not all kinds of FDI contribute in this 
way, however, and some can adversely impact certain dimensions of 
poverty through unsafe working conditions and environmental degra-
dation. Nevertheless, as it pertains to poverty alleviation, FDI is the 
most promising category of capital fl ows.15 As can be seen in Figure 
2.3, these fl ows have risen substantially in recent years.
Figure 2.3  Nominal Flows of Aid, FDI, Portfolio Investment, and 
Remittances to Developing Countries
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Many developing countries lack access to the technologies avail-
able in developed countries, and hosting MNEs from developed coun-
tries is one way to potentially gain access to that technology. There are 
limits to technology transfer, however. First, MNEs will employ the 
technology that most suits their strategic needs and not the develop-
ment needs of host countries. For example, MNEs can employ pro-
cesses that are much more capital intensive than would be desired on 
the basis of host-country employment considerations.16 Second, there is 
a strong tendency for MNEs to conduct their research and development 
in their home bases rather than in host countries.17 
Despite these general limitations, in some important cases, MNEs 
do transfer technology and establish signifi cant relationships with host-
country suppliers via backward linkages. If foreign MNE begins to 
source inputs locally rather than by importing them, the host country 
can gain a number of important benefi ts. First, employment can increase 
since the sourced inputs represent new production. Second, production 
technologies can be better adapted to local conditions since suppliers 
are more likely to employ labor-intensive processes. Third, the MNE 
can transfer state-of-the-art business practices and technologies to the 
local suppliers. Fourth, it is possible that the local suppliers can coalesce 
into a spatial cluster that supports innovation and upgrading.18 
Another avenue through which MNEs can positively affect host 
economies is through “spillovers” to other sectors of these econo-
mies. The evidence to date suggests that such spillovers do occur in 
some circumstances and can be signifi cant. However, in the words of 
Blomström and Sjöholm (1999), they are not “guaranteed, automatic, 
or free.” What determines whether positive technology spillovers will 
occur? Many factors are involved, and these include host country poli-
cies, MNE behavior, and industry characteristics. One key factor is the 
capacity of local fi rms to absorb foreign technologies. Blomström and 
Kokko (2003) suggest that learning is a key capacity that is respon-
sive to various host country policies, and evidence presented in Tsang, 
Nguyen, and Erramilli (2004) in the case of Vietnam supports this view. 
There is some evidence that MNEs in Africa offer higher wages 
than domestic fi rms (see te Velde and Morrissey [2003]). This effect is 
more predominant for skilled than unskilled workers. FDI can therefore 
have differential impacts that exclude unskilled workers. This can result 
in what te Velde (2001) refers to as the “low-income low-skill trap.” All 
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of these considerations point to the role of basic education and skills 
development in making the most of FDI for poverty alleviation.19 
The low-income countries as a whole are largely excluded from 
global FDI fl ows. For example, in 2002, low-income countries received 
only 2 percent of total FDI fl ows, with nearly half of this going to India 
and Vietnam alone. For these countries, exclusion from this dimension 
of globalization is a long-term concern.
Equity Portfolio Investment
There is evidence that capital infl ows in the form of equity portfolio 
investment might be more benefi cial than both bond fi nance and com-
mercial bank lending. For example, Reisen and Soto (2001) have exam-
ined the impact of all four capital infl ows considered here on growth 
for a sample of 44 countries. They fi nd that FDI, considered above, 
did indeed have a positive impact on economic growth. The most 
positive growth impact, however, came from equity portfolio fl ows. 
Bond fi nance, considered below, did not have any impact on growth, 
and commercial bank lending, also considered below, had a negative 
impact. These results suggest that equity infl ows, along with FDI, could 
play an especially positive role in growth, development, and poverty 
alleviation. 
Why can equity portfolio investment play a positive role in growth 
and development, at least under some circumstances? Rousseau and 
Wachtel (2000) summarize research on this question with four possi-
bilities: 1) equity portfolio infl ows are an important source of funds 
for developing countries; 2) the development of equity markets helps 
to provide an exit mechanism for venture capitalists, and this increases 
entrepreneurial activity; 3) portfolio infl ows assist developing coun-
tries to move from short-term fi nance to longer-term fi nance and help 
to fi nance investment in projects that have economies of scale; and 
4) the development of equity markets provides an informational mecha-
nism evaluating the performance of domestic fi rms and can help pro-
vide incentives to managers to perform well.
With regard to volatility, there is some evidence that institutional 
investors managing equity fl ows are less likely than banks to engage 
in herd and contagion behavior.20 However, in general, equity markets 
are underdeveloped in much of the developing world. For example, 
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nearly the entire net portfolio equity infl ows into Sub-Saharan Africa 
are accounted for by one country alone: South Africa. The World Bank 
(2004) summarizes the features of developing-country equity markets 
as follows:
Market capitalization as a share of GDP in low-income countries 
is about one-sixth of that in high-income countries . . . Stock ex-
changes in developing countries also tend to lag technologically 
behind developed markets. Technology plays a major role in the 
trading, clearance, and settlement processes; problems in those 
areas can discourage sophisticated investors. Institutions that 
supervise and support the operation of the stock exchange also 
tend to be weaker in developing countries. (p. 95)
The development of equity markets in low- and middle-income 
countries is more complex than it might fi rst appear, however. This is 
due to the increased globalization of fi nancial services. Observers have 
pointed to a set of domestic factors as being particularly important in 
equity market development. These factors include sound macroeco-
nomic policies, minimal degrees of technology, legal systems that pro-
tect shareholders, and open fi nancial markets. However, as pointed out 
by Claessens, Klingebiel, and Schmukler (2002), these are precisely 
the factors that tend to promote the “migration” of equity exchange 
out of developing countries to the major exchanges in fi nancial capital 
of developed countries. This migration process complicates standard 
notions of equity market development. Steil (2001) has argued that the 
way forward is to link local markets with global markets. However, 
there might remain medium-sized fi rms with local information needs 
that could benefi t from some kind of domestic or regional equity mar-
ket. This is an area that requires urgent attention for the development of 
novel approaches.
Bond Finance and Commercial Bank Lending
In the minds of the fi nancial world, there are signifi cant differences 
between portfolio equity investment and debt. This shows up in the fact 
that, in the case of bankruptcy, debt is given priority over equity. This 
tends to support the preference for debt over equity in markets, a prefer-
ence that appears to be misplaced from a development and poverty alle-
viation perspective. With regard to commercial bank lending, Dobson 
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and Hufbauer (2001) note that “bank lending may be more prone to run 
than portfolio capital, because banks themselves are highly leveraged, 
and they are relying on the borrower’s balance sheet to ensure repay-
ment” (p. 47). The World Bank (2001) notes that “incentives are key to 
limiting undue risk-taking and fraudulent behavior in the management 
and supervision of fi nancial intermediaries—especially banks that are 
prone to costly failure” (p. 3). 
What can be done to support the safe development of banking 
sectors in low-income countries? Some of the necessary steps can be 
thought of in terms of information, institutions, and incentives. With 
regard to information, it is important for banks to embrace internation-
ally sanctioned accounting and auditing procedures and to make the 
results of these assessments available to the public. In the case of insti-
tutions or the rules of the “banking game,” risk management practices 
(both credit and currency) must be suffi ciently stringent, and prudential 
regulation systems must be well developed. With regard to currency 
risk, the World Bank (2004) notes that “particular care should be taken 
to ensure that foreign-currency liabilities are appropriately hedged” (p. 
30).21 These information and institutional safeguards are no small task 
and inevitably cannot be achieved in the short term. Consequently, they 
should be buttressed with incentive measures in the form of market-
friendly taxes on banking capital infl ows. For example, Eichengreen 
(1999) argues that “banks borrowing abroad should be required to put 
up additional noninterest-bearing reserves with the central bank” (p. 
117). Such taxes on short-term capital infl ows in the form of variable 
deposit requirements appear to be important to prevent destabilizing 
episodes of overborrowing.22
To summarize, debt fl ows in the form of bond fi nance and com-
mercial bank lending appear to have different properties than equity 
fl ows in the form of FDI and portfolio equity investment. They are more 
prone to the imperfect behaviors that characterize fi nancial markets and 
do not appear to have positive growth effects as large as those associ-
ated with equity fl ows. Consequently, utilization of debt fi nance must 
be cautious and suffi ciently hedged against exchange rate risks.
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AID
It has been relatively recently that governments began to provide 
fi nancial and technical assistance to foreign countries. The purpose 
of this assistance has varied and has included geopolitical objectives, 
stimulating economic development, ameliorating poverty, promoting 
political outcomes, and ensuring civil stability. Although foreign aid 
is often visualized in terms of fi nancial “handouts” by rich countries to 
the world’s poorest inhabitants, the truth is signifi cantly more complex. 
Indeed, contrary to popular perception, low-income countries gener-
ally receive less than half of total aid fl ows. Much of the remainder is 
made up by fl ows to middle-income countries, and some high-income 
countries of strategic interest receive signifi cant amounts of assistance. 
Foreign aid, or offi cial development assistance (ODA), as it is tech-
nically known, is composed of a wide range of fi nancial and nonfi -
nancial instruments used in support of growth and poverty-reduction 
efforts. The transfer of fi nancial resources is an important part of devel-
opment assistance, but fi nance is only one of the instruments used to 
support development. Nonfi nancial forms of assistance include tangi-
ble grants of machinery or equipment and less tangible contributions 
such as the provision of technical analysis, advice, or capacity building, 
including trade-related capacity building. Such forms of assistance are 
vital, especially in environments where fi nance is not likely to con-
tribute to poverty reduction, such as early in postconfl ict situations or 
where institutions are particularly weak. 
As is evident in Figure 2.3, since the 1990s, FDI and portfolio fl ows 
have dwarfed the historically recent fl ow of aid. For example, develop-
ment aid in 2005 (US$106 billion) totaled only slightly over one-third 
of FDI in developing countries (US$281 billion). In terms of historical 
availability, fl ows of aid saw an initial rise from 1945 to 1960 but then 
increased only slowly from the 1960s until around 1990. From then 
until 2001, they dropped to only 0.2 percent of the GDP of high-income 
countries. In the last four or so years, this trend has been reversed, with 
ODA reaching a record high in 2005 and many countries committing 
themselves to doubling aid budgets by 2010. But only 5 of the 22 high-
income countries of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee 
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that pledged 0.7 percent of their GDP to foreign aid actually met this 
goal as of 2005.
In 2000, the Millennium Development Goals signaled a renewed 
push for increased aid fl ows and better aid effectiveness, and there has 
been signifi cant recent progress in increasing the impact of aid. Indeed, 
the estimated poverty-reduction productivity of ODA is signifi cantly 
better than it was in the early 1990s (Collier and Dollar 2004).23 When 
all aid is lumped together, some analyses have found no clear relation-
ship between aid and growth or poverty reduction (see, for example, 
Boone [1996]). But not all aid is aimed directly at poverty reduction, 
nor has aid always been provided in ways that will maximize growth. 
Moreover, because aid is often provided to help countries cope with 
external shocks, even if aid is reasonably well designed and allocated, 
the positive impact of such aid may be obscured by the magnitude of 
the shocks. Disaster relief, for example, is not aimed directly at long-
term poverty reduction, and thus it is no surprise that such aid is not 
correlated with that result.24 However, it does achieve its goal of helping 
to avert famine or assisting countries to recover from natural disasters. 
Donors initially placed too much emphasis on the role of what were 
often isolated projects, neglecting the quality of the overall country 
environment for growth, a mistake that adjustment or (policy-based) 
aid was intended to overcome. Additionally, as mentioned above, aid 
was sometimes allocated for purely strategic reasons, with growth and 
poverty reduction in these cases being distinct secondary concerns, if 
they were concerns at all. Given this diversity of motives, it is not sur-
prising that aid did not always have the hoped-for effects on growth and 
poverty reduction.
The adjustment programs that came into their own in partial 
response to the macroeconomic imbalances of the 1970s had their own 
problems. Donors incorrectly believed that conditionality on loans and 
grants could substitute for country ownership. Too often, governments 
receiving aid were not truly committed to reforms. Moreover, neither 
donors nor governments focused suffi ciently on poverty in designing 
the adjustment programs. In many countries, donors underestimated 
the importance of governance, institutional reforms, and social invest-
ments. Prescriptions for reform were too formulaic, ignoring the central 
need for country specifi city. As a result, weak governance and institu-
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tions reduced the amount of productivity growth and poverty reduction 
that could result from the macroeconomic reforms. 
During the 1990s, a rethinking of development models and the role 
of aid began. This was facilitated by a combination of four develop-
ments. First, the end of the Cold War reduced the geopolitical pres-
sures on aid agencies. Second, there was an increasing recognition of 
the successes of India, China, and other developing countries that had 
achieved macro balance and sustained growth while adopting their own 
particular development models. Third, there was mounting evidence of 
an apparent failure of orthodox adjustment models adopted by African 
and other highly indebted countries, as evidenced by the lack of posi-
tive growth and poverty outcomes. Finally, there was a growing body of 
analytic literature that highlighted the importance of the need for a more 
comprehensive approach to development and wider understanding of 
poverty, focusing on both human capital (education, health) and physi-
cal capital (infrastructure), as well as institutions and participation.25 
The statistical evidence shows that large-scale fi nancial aid can gen-
erally be used effectively for poverty reduction when reasonably good 
policies are in place.26 In recent years, donors have increasingly acted 
on these fi ndings by tailoring support to local needs and circumstances. 
Thus, the balance of support has moved toward providing large-scale 
aid to those that can use it well and focusing on knowledge and capacity-
building support in other countries. This has been refl ected in greater 
selectivity and coordination in lending, shifting resources toward gov-
ernance and institutions, emphasizing ownership, and making room 
for diverse responses to local needs. These new approaches and proce-
dures have begun to pay off. However, it is clear that there is still much 
to learn: for example, how can countries with very weak governance 
effectively catalyze and support reforms and institution building?
Should we then use only policy and institutional quality as mea-
sures in determining aid fl ows? This would probably be too rash a con-
clusion. Research by Clemens, Radelet, and Bhavnani (2004) takes an 
entirely different approach: instead of focusing on the different policy 
and institutional characteristics of recipient countries, they focus on the 
characteristics of different types of aid fl ows. Importantly, they only 
consider what they term “short-impact” aid, which includes budget and 
balance of payments support, infrastructure investments, and aid for 
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productive sectors such as agriculture and industry. In contrast to pre-
vious studies, they fi nd a strong impact of aid on growth (and thus on 
poverty reduction, at least to some extent) regardless of institutions and 
policies.27 In light of such evidence, it probably is too soon to call for 
substantial reallocations of aid other than of those fl ows that refl ect only 
strategic, rather than humanitarian or economic, considerations.
MIGRATION
International migration involves the movement of people, on either 
a temporary or permanent basis, among the countries of the world 
economy. Throughout human history, these changes of residence have 
helped to alleviate human suffering, enhance technological progress, 
and promote cultural exchange. As of 2006, approximately 200 million 
people, or 3 percent of the world’s population, lived outside their coun-
try of birth. Although this percentage is low by historical standards, 
international migration has doubled since 1980. Migration continues to 
be a key dimension of globalization and development, albeit one that 
has complex determinants and outcomes. 
A central component of the modern era of globalization that began 
in the late nineteenth century was the Age of Mass Migration, described 
by Hatton and Williamson (1998). Between 1850 and 1914, approxi-
mately 55 million Europeans migrated, most of them unskilled males 
who settled in the United States. As Manning (2005) emphasizes, how-
ever, the Age of Mass Migration was not just European in nature, with 
50 million Chinese and 30 million Indians also migrating (not all vol-
untarily), primarily to serve as unskilled laborers in British colonies in 
Africa and the Pacifi c. Since then, much has changed, with migration 
becoming an increasingly elusive escape route from poverty.
High-skilled migrants from developing countries are commonly 
trained at substantial costs to the taxpayers of source countries through 
public education systems. Their departure thus has profound effects in 
the form of what is known as brain drain. Source countries can also 
lose tax revenues that migrants would have generated. More impor-
tantly, many of the skills sent from less-developed to more-developed 
countries are already scarce in source countries. In the case of medi-
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cal services, for which more-developed countries have a strong desire 
and less-developed countries an urgent need, the brain drain can cost 
lives. In Malawi, for example, HIV/AIDS has reduced the country’s life 
expectancy to under 40 years. Despite this health crisis, the country has 
lost approximately half its nursing staff to migration. Partly as a result, 
the rate at which Malawian women die during pregnancy and childbirth 
has approximately doubled.28
The emigration of skilled workers does not always create problems 
for source countries. In some cases, emigration alerts outside investors to 
a large or relatively underused skill base of the source country. The suc-
cess of skilled Indian migrants in the United States, for instance, helped 
to spur the large infl ow of information and communication technology-
related FDI to India seen during recent years. Many foreign informa-
tion and communication technology companies, impressed by the talent 
working for them outside India, sought equivalently skilled individu-
als within India as employees in FDI-related facilities. Thus, when the 
conditions are right, skilled migrants are able to generate networks of 
investment, trade, and technology transfer that increase the productivity 
and demand for skills in the home country, while extending the global 
technology frontier and lowering the cost of products used by billions 
of people worldwide. 
Another potentially compensating benefi t of the brain drain is that it 
tends to increase the demand for skills in the source country by raising 
the rate of return to education. Some researchers have suggested that, 
even accounting for the emigration of skilled individuals, the increase 
in demand for education generated by brain drain may actually increase 
the number of skilled workers in the population. This is known as brain 
gain. While brain gain outcomes are possible, they depend on very large 
responses in the supply of education and training. They are not, there-
fore, a general outcome of high-skilled migration.
The most easily quantifi able benefi t of emigration to source coun-
tries is the fl ow of money, or remittances, sent by migrant workers to 
their home countries. Recent estimates suggest that the total remittance 
fl ow to developing countries now exceeds US$200 billion (see Figure 
2.3, which does not quite capture the current value due to data lags in 
the other series). In a number of countries, remittance infl ows are larger 
than infl ows of foreign direct investment and can compose up to 10 
percent of national incomes. As is evident in Figure 2.4, such fl ows can 
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Figure 2.4  Foreign Remittances, 2003
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make a signifi cant difference for families living in poverty in source 
countries, which is a common reason why communities allow and 
sometimes even encourage their family members to seek work abroad 
(see Adams and Page [2005]).
Under the auspices of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the 
liberalization of services trade has occurred in a number of sectors of 
interest to developed countries such as fi nance and telecommunica-
tions. The WTO’s General Agreement of Trade in Services (GATS) rec-
ognizes the temporary movement of natural persons as a way to export 
certain labor-intensive services such as housekeeping and construction. 
Given the natural comparative advantage of developing countries in 
such labor-intensive services, this channel could be of great importance 
to their trade and development prospects. The WTO protocol on the 
temporary movement of natural persons, however, is largely limited to 
the exchange of corporate personnel and is not designed to enhance the 
delivery of labor-intensive services. This urgently needs to be rectifi ed. 
IDEAS
Idea formation and reformation have been and continue to be inte-
gral to development processes and policies because, as emphasized by 
Adelman (2001), development processes are signifi cantly nonlinear and 
nonunique. Consequently, ideas play a key role in organizing and mak-
ing sense of development experience and have gone through a number 
of paradigm shifts. Importantly, the environments to which develop-
ment ideas respond are increasingly affected by the various processes 
characterizing globalization. For this reason, the role of ideas in devel-
opment processes cannot be clearly understood without reference to the 
various other dimensions of increased global integration. 
Ideas are both a powerful infl uence on development and a key 
dimension of globalization. Relevant here are three areas of inquiry 
related to ideas, development, and globalization: 1) the idea of devel-
opment itself, along with the related issue of the idea of growth; 2) the 
role of ideas in globalization processes; and 3) the question of ideas for 
development, along with the related issues of development knowledge 
management, intellectual property, and learning. We focus here on the 
up10sagaidch2.indd   23 6/22/2010   2:33:45 PM
24   Goldin and Reinert
last of these, ideas for development, since it has the most relevance to 
this chapter.
Ideas are codifi ed in the form of knowledge, and knowledge is 
in many respects a public good. Once an idea has been codifi ed, that 
knowledge can often be used at low marginal cost, and its use by any 
one person does not preclude its use by others. This characteristic of 
knowledge is precisely the hallmark of a public good and suggests that 
knowledge, like other public goods, will be underprovided by market 
systems. The challenge, then, is the effective development and man-
agement of knowledge, recognizing its (global) public good nature. 
Knowledge management, a diffi cult task for fi rms, is even more daunt-
ing for developing countries.
A fi rst element of knowledge management for development is 
increasing the voice of developing countries and their impoverished 
citizens.29 This is an essential ingredient of inclusive globalization and 
is especially important in global consultation and decision making 
with direct consequences for the citizens of developing countries. It 
is also important to enhance developing-country participation in glob-
al institutions in order to ensure their legitimacy. The governance of 
the United Nations (at least at the Security Council level), the World 
Bank, and the IMF refl ects the balance of power 60 years ago.30 There 
is widespread recognition of the need for enhancing the participation of 
developing countries. Although some progress has been made in areas 
related to program formation, the structural issues of voting rights and 
board representation remain intractable. It remains, however, as stated 
by Bhattacharya and Griffi th-Jones (2004), “important to go beyond 
consultation to full representation of developing countries in bodies that 
deliberate and set international norms and action plans” (p. 205). The 
principles of transparency, accountability, and good governance that 
the global institutions advocate for developing countries should also 
be embraced by these institutions themselves. The requisite reforms are 
indeed daunting, but failure to undertake the challenge will undermine 
any chances of an effective, multilateral system for managing global-
ization and development.
A second element of knowledge management for development is 
broad access. In addition to investing in education and research, govern-
ments can facilitate the sharing of knowledge and make special efforts 
to overcome the exclusion of poor communities from ideas. A particu-
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lar challenge is to make knowledge available in ways and languages 
that can be understood by wide audiences, such as local development 
practitioners who do not speak English. Timely and effective informa-
tion fl ows on issues important to poor communities can both mitigate 
risks and expand opportunities. Such efforts include providing market 
prices to poor farmers via village mobile phones, broadcasting weather 
information and disaster warnings on local radios, and highlighting the 
risks of HIV/AIDS and the benefi ts of public health measures in com-
munity information campaigns. In these sorts of cases, knowledge helps 
to empower poor people.
A third element of knowledge management for development is 
increased technology transfer to developing countries. Article 66.2 of 
the agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS) of the WTO commits developed countries to providing “incen-
tives to enterprises and institutions in their territories for the purpose of 
promoting and encouraging technology transfer” to the least-developed 
countries. This commitment needs to be implemented in practice and 
applied to a wider set of countries. As outlined by Hoekman, Maskus, 
and Saggi (2005), this can occur through a variety of measures, including
• incentives for corporations and nongovernmental organizations 
to transfer mature patent rights or to provide technical assistance,
• public support for research into the specifi c technology needs of 
developing countries,
• university training for students from the low-income countries in 
science and technology,
• fi nance for participation of developing country representatives in 
standard-setting bodies, and
• public purchase of patents on certain technologies for free use in 
developing countries.
These and other steps can better ensure that knowledge in the form of 
international technological development is more broadly spread in the 
developing world.
Ideas codifi ed into knowledge can become property when legal sys-
tems confer and enforce intellectual property rights (IPRs). The role of 
IPRs in economic growth and development is controversial to say the 
least. The standard argument is that the presence of strong intellectual 
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property rights spurs innovation, which in turn leads to higher rates of 
economic growth and poverty reduction. The basis of this argument is 
that, if strong property rights provide good incentives for the produc-
tion of things, they must also provide appropriate incentives for the 
production of ideas. Boldrin and Levine (2002; 2004a,b) question this 
assertion, arguing that intellectual property has come to mean not only 
the right to own and sell ideas, but also the right to regulate their use, 
which can create a socially ineffi cient monopoly. They agree that, for 
effi ciency reasons, ideas should be protected and available for sale, just 
like any other commodity. They object, however, to the idea of an intel-
lectual monopoly, arguing that monopoly is neither needed for, nor a 
necessary consequence of, innovation, and that intellectual property is 
not necessary for innovation and growth. In fact, it can hurt more than 
help. Boldrin and Levine suggest that, although the producers of a new 
product or service should have the right to benefi t from its sale, they 
should not be able to appropriate the right of others to learn from the 
ideas embodied in that product. This argument has important implica-
tions for the role of ideas in globalization and development.
Since IPRs involve a key trade-off between potentially enhancing 
innovation and supporting the monopolization of ideas, their applica-
tion requires careful analysis of both benefi ts and costs of conferral in 
order to ensure that IPR regimes promote both growth and more equi-
table development. How this can best be done is a question to which 
answers greatly diverge. We consider here the issues of patents and tra-
ditional knowledge.
Patents are a central concern with regard to the role of IPRs in 
development, especially in the areas of health, food, and agriculture. As 
summarized by Leach (2004), for instance, “The essential trade-off in 
choosing the patent life is that a longer patent life raises the rate at which 
discoveries occur, but reduces the social benefi ts of each discovery” 
(p. 175). The proponents of stronger patent protection in developing 
countries argue that this protection will promote domestic innovation 
as well as the fl ow of ideas through increased FDI and exports. There 
is not complete agreement on this matter, however. For example, Kash 
and Kingston (2001) argue that, in the case of complex technologies, 
patent protection can actually inhibit innovation. To some extent, then, 
the ability of increased patent protection to deliver access to knowledge 
and innovation is uncertain.
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One suggested reform of current intellectual property arrangements 
is to modify rules governing patents under the TRIPS agreement to 
allow for patent ladders, in which the minimum extent of patent protec-
tion varies according to level of per capita income. Although designing 
such a system is not straightforward, this is a way to avoid what, in 
the case of environmental or labor standards, is disparagingly called a 
“one-size-fi ts-all” approach to the standardization of global governance 
systems.
One key area regarding patent protection is in the fi eld of pharma-
ceuticals and the extension of patent rights to developing countries as 
required by TRIPS. Although some argue that the extension of intel-
lectual property rights may lead to more research on drugs to address 
developing country needs, the evidence on the short experience since 
this extension remains hotly contested (see, for example, Lanjouw and 
Cockburn [2001]). There is evidence that the relatively low levels of 
purchasing power in developing countries and the apparent lack of 
commercial interest by the pharmaceutical companies remain impor-
tant barriers.
Recent years have seen a number of highly signifi cant efforts to 
boost investment in research and its application in developing coun-
tries. These include the Measles Initiative, the Global Alliance for Vac-
cines and Immunizations, the Roll Back Malaria Partnership, and the 
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria. Despite these 
notable efforts, the recent example of the pressure placed on the gov-
ernments of Brazil, India, and South Africa to honor U.S. patents on 
HIV/AIDS drugs, thus raising the costs of these drugs to AIDS patients 
in these countries, signals a remaining issue with regard to TRIPS and 
public health. 
There appear to be two approaches to dealing with the ongoing issue 
of intellectual property and public health, namely the Lanjouw (2006) 
proposal on regional declarations in patent applications and compul-
sory licensing under a permanent amendment to TRIPS. Lanjouw pro-
poses that developed-country patent systems allow for patent enforce-
ment only in one of two regions of the world: developed countries or 
developing countries. In the case of what Lanjouw terms “global” dis-
eases such as cancer or heart disease, developed-country pharmaceuti-
cal companies would choose to ensure patent protection in developed 
countries where markets are signifi cantly larger, allowing for less costly 
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delivery of generic pharmaceuticals to the developing world. In the 
case of “tropical” diseases such as malaria, pharmaceutical companies 
would choose to ensure patent protection in the developing countries, 
hopefully spurring innovation. Thus, the trade-off between innovation 
and low cost would hopefully break out in the desired fashion across 
global and tropical diseases. 
This is an important proposal that has consequently received a good 
deal of attention. It may not, however, adequately cover some important 
diseases such as HIV/AIDS that have both global and tropical char-
acteristics. There could indeed be cases where compulsory licensing 
proves to be required in order to adequately address public health cri-
ses. A 2001 Doha ministerial declaration on TRIPS and public health 
reconfi rmed certain “fl exibilities” available to protect public health, 
including compulsory licensing. This declaration did not, however, 
address the issue of the right of countries without domestic capacity 
to import nonpatent pharmaceuticals.31 A 2003 WTO decision on this 
issue allowed poor countries to import off-patent, generic drugs under 
specifi ed conditions, and directed the WTO TRIPS Council to prepare 
an amendment based “where appropriate” on the decision (Matthews 
2004, 2006). An agreement regarding this amendment was reached in 
2005 and ratifi ed in 2007. It remains, however, both for supporting leg-
islation in WTO member countries to be fully enacted and for the provi-
sions of the amendment to be tested in practice.32 It has become clear 
that capacity building is necessary to support use of the system.
From the point of view of poverty alleviation, it is essential that 
intellectual property protection be extended to traditional knowledge, 
folklore, and culture, or what Finger (2004) calls “poor people’s knowl-
edge.” It is not only essential that intellectual property regimes allow 
developing countries to benefi t from ideas developed in rich countries, 
but also that their own indigenous ideas are suitably protected. The key 
issue here, as expressed by Finger, is that of “enhancing the commercial 
value of poor people’s knowledge in which there are no worries about 
this use being culturally offensive to members of the community or 
about this use undermining the traditional culture of the community” 
(p. 3). Unless it extends to such types of knowledge, intellectual prop-
erty protection will fail to positively help poor communities. Individual 
country governments can help in this process by following India’s lead 
and constructing Traditional Knowledge Digital Libraries containing 
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formal inventories of all cultural property that its citizens might exploit 
in the future (Sahai 2003). This is important to prevent future theft of 
the country’s cultural patrimony.
CONCLUSION
History and the recent experiences of many countries show that glo-
balization can be a tool for reducing poverty. People living in poverty 
are less likely to remain so in a country that is exchanging its goods, 
services, and ideas with the rest of the world. Yet this positive impact 
and reach remains uneven and there is a need for global coordination 
and more effective global governance on issues such as armaments and 
climate change. Several key areas for action are outlined below.33
First, global trade negotiations must produce more balanced out-
comes if developing countries are to be able to successfully lift their 
people out of poverty. Their ability to trade a wide range of goods and 
services must be facilitated, and rich countries must stop impeding 
development by the imposition of damaging tariff barriers and agri-
cultural subsidies. For instance, there are twice as many tariff barriers 
imposed upon goods produced by poor people as those produced by rich 
countries. Nearly US$300 billion a year is spent on agricultural subsi-
dies, which are almost worth more than the entire GDP of sub-Saharan 
Africa.34 These subsidies deny developing countries export markets and 
damage their capability to sell their produce in their own country. These 
practices compound downward trends in commodity pricing, increase 
instability, and undermine potential for diversifi cation into higher value-
added manufactured products. Therefore, reforming the world trade 
system is a vital step in ensuring that all the world’s inhabitants are able 
to reap the benefi ts of globalization.
The second area for action is the increased provision of aid, assis-
tance, and debt relief to countries that demonstrate a commitment to the 
effective and equitable use of the additional resources. As mentioned 
above, aid volumes have declined during recent decades to approxi-
mately 0.25 percent of high-income countries’ GDP, despite the fact 
that donor countries are richer now than ever before and that aid has 
never been more effectively used. Providing increased foreign assis-
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tance and implementing more rigorous schemes to monitor and evalu-
ate the effective use of that aid are thus critical to ensuring that the 
gains provided by globalization are not reversed by bad governance and 
ineffective use of aid.
Foreign aid resource transfers are particularly important in the 
poorest countries, and much higher levels of aid are urgently required 
for investments in health, education, infrastructure, and for combating 
HIV/AIDS and other diseases. These investments cannot be fi nanced 
by domestic savings alone, especially in countries that are currently 
crushed under burdens of debt and escaping the ravages of past corrup-
tion and mismanagement.
A third area for action is enhancing the benefi ts of migration and 
mitigating the negative effects. Remittances of over US$200 billion 
have fl owed directly to a large number of individuals and communities 
(in contrast to much of aid). The transaction costs of such fl ows should 
be lowered from the current 10–15 percent to around 1 percent, which 
is closer to the cost of transfers between rich countries. On the other 
hand, the loss of highly skilled individuals in the “brain drain” needs to 
be mitigated, as it is a severe problem for many African and Caribbean 
developing countries. Addressing the problems of the current migration 
system and increasing its ability to provide real gains to poor people 
will require a multilateral as well as bilateral commitment to effective 
migration reform and management.
Finally, the international community should support global public 
goods. Three examples are in the areas of eradicating the major infec-
tious diseases, enhancing agricultural research, and combating climate 
change. Most important, however, is the need for global peace and 
stability to prevent war and civil confl ict, which do much to generate 
underdevelopment in many parts of the world.
Globalization has the potential to be a vehicle for shared growth, 
prosperity, and reductions in poverty. However, this potential is not yet 
being adequately realized, and the positive impacts of globalization 
remain uneven. Global trade equity, more and better aid, effectively 
benefi ting from migration, and the support of global public goods are 
key areas for action on the route to successfully achieving development 
and harnessing the gains of globalization.
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Notes
 1. For further, more detailed discussion, we refer the reader to Goldin and Reinert 
(2007).
 2. See, for example, James (1996, Chapter 1), O’Rourke and Williamson (1999), and 
World Bank (2002). 
 3. See Bruton (1998) for a review of import substitution industrialization.
 4. See Levinson (2006) on the role of container shipping in this process.
 5. See Dollar and Kraay (2004), for example. An alternative view is given in 
Rodríquez and Rodrik (2001). A thorough review of trade and poverty is provided 
by Winters, McCulloch, and McKay (2004).
 6. The fact that the trade-poverty alleviation linkage is not automatic has been 
stressed by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2004) in 
the case of the least developed countries.
 7. Watkins and Fowler (2002) note that “In itself, trade is not inherently opposed to 
the interests of poor people. International trade can be a force for good, or for bad 
. . . The outcomes are not pre-determined. They are shaped by the way in which 
international trade relations are managed, and by national policies” (p. 28).
 8. On the case of Bangladesh, for example, see Zohir (2001) and Watkins and Fowler 
(2002). 
 9. For a review of the evidence on trade liberalization and productivity, see Winters, 
McCulloch, and McKay (2004).
 10. On the latter, see de Ferranti et al. (2002).
 11. This point is emphasized by Reinert (2004).
 12. Failure to do this weakens the claims of Rodrik and Subramanian (2008), for 
example.
 13. The World Bank (2001) notes that “If fi nance is fragile, banking is the most fragile 
part” (p. 11).
 14. For a critique of premature capital account liberalization, see Stiglitz (2000). As 
the World Bank (2001) notes, “Poor sequencing of fi nancial liberalization in a 
poor country environment has undoubtedly contributed to bank insolvency” (p. 
89). Hanson, Honohan, and Majnoni (2003) also note that “the riskiness of capital 
account liberalization without fi scal adjustment . . . and without reasonably strong 
fi nancial regulation and supervision and a sound domestic fi nancial system, is well 
recognized” (p. 10).
 15. The present chapter is in broad agreement with Singh (1999), who says that “The 
experience of many Asian and Latin American countries with portfolio capital 
fl ows . . . indicates that the African countries would benefi t from using their efforts 
and institutional resources to attract FDI rather than portfolio fl ows” (p. 356). It 
does, however, distinguish between portfolio fl ows in the form of equity invest-
ment and those in the form of bond fi nance, with a preference for the former.
 16. Caves (1996) notes that “Survey evidence indicates that MNEs do some adapting 
(of technologies to labor-abundant conditions), but not a great deal, and it appears 
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that the costs of adaptation commonly are high relative to the benefi ts expected by 
individual companies” (p. 241).
 17. Dunning (1993) notes that “With the exception of some European-based com-
panies, the proportion of R&D activity by MNEs undertaken outside their home 
countries is generally quite small and, in the case of Japanese fi rms, negligible” (p. 
301).
 18. For the role of clusters in natural resource–based development, see Ramos (1998).
 19. Borensztein, De Gregorio, and Lee (1998) fi nd that it is the combination of FDI 
and education that has a statistically signifi cant impact on growth.
 20. Dobson and Hufbauer (2001, Chapter 1) review this evidence. Singh (1999), to 
some extent at least, contests this conclusion. 
 21. Mistakes made in these areas have proved to be too costly to the poor in the past 
for countries to relax their vigilance. Prasad et al. (2003) conclude that “The rela-
tive importance of different sources of fi nancing for domestic investment, as prox-
ied by the following three variables, has been shown to be positively associated 
with the incidence and the severity of currency and fi nancial crises: the ratio of 
bank borrowing or other debt relative to foreign direct investment; the shortness 
of the term structure of external debt; and the share of external debt denominated 
in foreign currencies” (p. 49). 
 22. As emphasized by Bhinda et al. (1999), variable deposit requirements are fl exible 
in three dimensions: 1) percentage, 2) minimum deposit period, and 3) application 
to new versus existing credits. These fl exibilities, as well as their market-friendly 
nature, make variable deposit requirements an attractive policy option.
 23. See, in particular, Goldin, Rogers, and Stern (2002). The overall debate on aid 
effectiveness is reviewed in Clemens, Radelet, and Bhavani (2004).
 24. See Owens and Hoddinott (1998). As Clemens, Radelet, and Bhavani (2004) note, 
“This kind of assistance should have a negative simple correlation with growth, 
as the disaster simultaneously causes both low growth and large aid fl ows. While 
it is possible that aid might mitigate that fall in growth, any additional pathway of 
causation from humanitarian aid to growth is extremely diffi cult to detect” (p. 2).
 25. In the realm of foreign aid, some (but not all) of this new thinking was refl ected in 
World Bank (1998).
 26. See Burnside and Dollar (2000). These results have been recently questioned by 
Easterly, Levine, and Roodman (2004).
  27.  The authors note that “The result is robust over a wide variety of specifi cations . . . 
It holds over various time periods, stands up whether we include or exclude infl u-
ential observations, and remains robust when controlling for possible endogeneity 
of several independent variables” (p. 40).
 28. Approaches to deal with the diffi cult issue of brain drain of health professionals 
are discussed in Martineau, Decker, and Bundred (2004).
 29. This theme has been recently taken up by Sen (2006, Chapter 7), who states that 
“The preeminent practical challenges today include the possibility of making use 
of the remarkable benefi ts of economic connections, technological progress, and 
political opportunity in a way that pays adequate attention to the interests of the 
deprived and the underdog” (pp. 131–132). 
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 30. As Derviş (2005) notes, “Without greater legitimacy at the supranational level, 
progress in solving global problems will be very diffi cult” (p. 3). Derviş makes 
very specifi c proposals for changing the governance structures of these institutions 
that deserve careful consideration.
 31. This issue arises because Article 31(f) of TRIPS limits the use of pharmaceuti-
cals produced under compulsory licenses to the domestic markets of producing 
countries.
 32. Matthews (2006) notes that “It is perhaps surprising that no developing country 
has yet used the new mechanism to allow the importation of generic medicines 
following the issuance of a compulsory license in a developed country prior to 
patent expiry” (p. 130).
 33. Further, detailed policy proposals are made in Goldin and Reinert (2007).
 34. To simplify, these are roughly half in the form of producer support payments and 
half in the form of market price support, the latter effected through border mea-
sures. See Tokarick (2008). 
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